Institutional Divergence in US and Brazilian Governance
Contrasting electoral systems create distinct legislative challenges for Trump and Lula's administrations.
1Institutional Paradox of 2026
The 2026 election cycle presents a unique institutional paradox for both the United States and Brazil. Both Donald Trump and Luiz Inacio Lula da Silva face the challenge of governing without a clear majority in their respective legislative houses. However, the structural consequences of this divided power vary significantly between nations.
2Legislative Gridlock Theories
David Mayhew’s research in Divided We Govern challenges the notion that divided governments inevitably suffer from paralysis. Analyzing American legislative output from 1946 to 1990, he found that the volume of relevant laws remains consistent. The core issue is not necessarily the quantity of legislation, but rather the executive's operational autonomy.
3Delegation and Executive Oversight
Epstein and O’Halloran argue that under divided governments, legislatures tend to delegate fewer powers to the executive branch. Instead, they impose stricter oversight and fiscal constraints. This dynamic forces presidents to navigate a more restrictive environment, where the margin for autonomous decision-making is significantly reduced by legislative checks and balances.
4Trump's Bipartisan Obstacles
Trump faces a Democratic majority in both the House and the Senate. The American two-party system provides minimal incentives for opposition members to share the political costs or credits of a presidential agenda. Consequently, Trump risks political isolation, as cooperation could inadvertently strengthen his electoral adversaries in future legislative cycles.
5Brazil's Multiparty Coalition Dynamics
In contrast, Brazil’s multiparty system allows for flexible coalition building. Although the PT-PCdoB-PV federation holds only 88 deputies and nine senators, the government can negotiate support with various parties. This structure enables Lula to isolate the opposition, specifically the PL, which holds 121 deputies and 29 senators, without needing total consensus.
6Coalition Management Challenges
While institutional pathways for a majority exist in Brazil, creating a functional, sustainable coalition remains difficult. Historical petista experiences involved excessively broad and heterogeneous alliances that often drifted from the congressional ideological median. Building a majority is a procedural possibility, but maintaining a cohesive governing block requires significant political skill.
7Comparative Governance Outcomes
Objective conditions for achieving a majority are currently more favorable for Lula than for Trump. The Brazilian system allows for surgical negotiations with smaller parties to bypass the main opposition. Conversely, the rigid American bipartisan structure forces a binary choice between total legislative obstruction and rare, high-stakes political compromise.
8Strategic Leadership Requirements
The ultimate success of these administrations depends on executive strategy. Lula must determine if his fourth term will reflect lessons learned regarding coalition management and ideological alignment. Meanwhile, Trump must navigate a hostile legislative environment where the lack of institutional incentives for cooperation will likely define his governing trajectory.
Original article: Estadão — Institutional Divergence in US and Brazilian Governance