Securing Global Submarine Cable Infrastructure in Wartime
The vulnerability of undersea cables poses a critical national security risk requiring urgent strategic reform.
1Hidden Arctic Threats
In spring 2026, Britain, Norway, and the United States disrupted a covert Russian operation near Svalbard. The mission involved deep-sea submersibles simulating the deployment of weapons to disable critical submarine cables. This incident highlighted the vulnerability of satellite ground stations and the urgent need for robust subsea infrastructure defense strategies.
2Fragile Global Backbone
Submarine cables carry the vast majority of global internet and government traffic, forming the backbone of the modern economy. Despite their importance, the United States lacks a comprehensive wartime repair strategy. Current commercial systems are designed for routine accidents, not the simultaneous, multi-theater sabotage campaigns that modern adversaries are capable of executing.
3Routine vs. Strategic Failure
Cable faults occur 150 to 200 times annually due to fishing gear or anchors, usually handled by 22 specialized global repair ships. However, clustered failures like those seen in Tonga or Vietnam demonstrate that multiple cuts can exhaust spare capacity, leading to restoration times stretching from months to over a year.
4Supply Chain Vulnerabilities
Repairing a cable requires specific jointing kits, repeaters, and matching cable types, which are not interchangeable. Tonga’s 18-month restoration delay was largely due to manufacturing and shipping replacement parts from France. A wartime strategy must include pre-positioning trusted spares to avoid the lengthy procurement processes that currently hinder rapid restoration efforts.
5Dependence on Chinese Capacity
The Yokohama Zone maintenance agreement relies on S.B. Submarine Systems, a firm majority-owned by the Chinese state. In a conflict involving China or Taiwan, the United States cannot assume access to these vessels. Beijing could simply decline to sail, effectively paralyzing repair efforts for critical American-connected cable systems during a crisis.
6Deactivation of Navy Assets
The U.S. Navy deactivated its cable ship, the Zeus, in 2025, leaving the nation without a government-operated repair vessel. The current Cable Security Fleet, funded at $10 million annually, provides only minimal capability. These private ships operate commercially and may be located far from their assigned areas when a crisis occurs.
7European Modular Solutions
In 2026, the European Union allocated 60 million euros for modular repair equipment pre-positioned at ports. These modules can be rapidly installed on pre-configured vessels, offering a flexible response to cable damage. The United States currently lacks an equivalent program, leaving it reliant on slower, less adaptable commercial repair ship deployment models.
8Legal Ambiguity of Targets
Submarine cables and repair ships lack the clear protections afforded to hospital ships under international law. The 2025 Newport Manual treats military communications cables as legitimate military objectives. Because government traffic often travels over commercial lines, distinguishing between civilian and military infrastructure remains a significant legal challenge during active armed conflict.
9Insurance and Crew Risks
War-risk insurance can be canceled with only 72 hours notice, as seen during 2026 hostilities in the Persian Gulf. Seafarer unions may designate conflict zones as Warlike Operations Areas, granting crews the right to refuse to sail. Without guaranteed insurance and crew safety, even available ships may remain docked during critical emergencies.
10The Escort Dilemma
Naval escorts for repair ships could deter interference but might also classify the vessel as a military objective under the laws of naval warfare. Protection strategies must balance this risk: close escorts for government-contracted ships and area security for commercial vessels to maintain their civilian status while ensuring essential repairs proceed.
11Satellite Limitations
Low Earth orbit satellites are often proposed as a backup, but they cannot replace the massive capacity of subsea cables. Satellite networks rely on ground stations that are themselves connected by cables, and their signals are susceptible to jamming. They remain an access technology rather than a viable replacement for the global backbone.
12Strategic National Security Mission
Wartime cable repair must be elevated to a national security mission with dedicated federal authority and funding. By designating cables as critical infrastructure and expanding the Cable Security Fleet, the United States can prioritize repairs and secure the necessary assets to withstand a campaign of deliberate, simultaneous, and geographically dispersed sabotage.
Original article: War on the Rocks — Securing Global Submarine Cable Infrastructure in Wartime