Railway Union Demands Double Human Verification for Critical Rail Operations
Alferro urges safety agency to expand oversight beyond recent ministerial announcements after Urda accident.
1Union Challenges Safety Scope
The Alferro union has formally requested the State Railway Safety Agency (AESF) to expand mandatory double-check protocols. While the Transport Ministry recently announced new validation systems following the Urda accident, the union argues these measures fail to cover all critical procedures where a single individual currently holds decision-making authority.
2Risks in Degraded Operations
When automated protection systems like LZB or ERTMS fail, railway operations enter a degraded state. Currently, the Railway Circulation Regulations allow a single controller to verify if a track section is clear and authorize train movement. Alferro warns that this concentration of responsibility creates a significant vulnerability to individual human error.
3Targeting Specific Manual Procedures
Alferro highlights two specific procedures as high-risk: telephone blocking (BT) and temporary track banalization (BTV). These methods allow traffic management during system anomalies or when trains must run against the normal flow. The union notes that current regulations explicitly permit these tasks to be managed by one person without independent verification.
4Critical Decision-Making Vulnerability
The union emphasizes that manual decisions become exponentially more critical when automated safety systems are offline. Essential operations, such as identifying the last train position or verifying that no incompatible authorizations exist, currently rely on a single operator. Alferro argues that these tasks require a second, independent check to ensure safety.
5Proposed Verification Mechanism
Alferro proposes that a second, duly authorized professional must independently verify all checks performed by the first controller. This process would require both controls to be registered with professional identification. Any discrepancy between the two operators would automatically block the authorization of movement until the situation is fully clarified and resolved.
6Flexible Implementation Strategy
The union clarifies that the two controllers do not need to be physically present in the same control center. The second verification could be performed from another station or control post, provided there is access to reliable information. This approach aims to maintain operational independence without requiring immediate, costly infrastructure changes.
7Broader Regulatory Pressure
This request follows a previous proposal submitted to Renfe Viajeros regarding LZB transmission losses. Alferro is now pushing the AESF to coordinate with Adif to implement this second safety barrier across the entire national network. The goal is to ensure consistent protection standards regardless of which operator provides the specific rail service.
8Evaluating Ministerial Commitments
The union's intervention questions the actual scope of the plan announced by Minister Óscar Puente. While the government promised supervision for critical decisions, the specific application to various exceptional procedures remains undefined. Alferro maintains that this proposal is not a critique of professional competence, but a necessary additional safety barrier.